 (From BBC's web site.) 
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"The Empire Service first broadcast on short wave radio in 1932. Its aim was to develop international communications to Britain's overseas territories. In the run up to World War II, the Foreign Office began funding BBC language services to counter the growing international propaganda of the Axis powers. From its start, the Service's editorial independence from the British government was safeguarded, as it was seen as the cornerstone of the service's credibility and therefore of its impact. After emerging as the leading global broadcaster during the war, BBC World Service was incorporated into the BBC's Royal Charter in 1946."
The Persian Service radio, originally launched during the final years of the Second World War, has played a major role in relations between the UK and the Persian-speaking world in crucial political conjunctures. During the last 66 years -as funded by the Foreign and Commonwealth Office -many Iranians have viewed the Persian Service with skepticism yet at the same time regarded it as one of the most trusted sources of news and information.
The BBC claims it has kept its independence, strongly guarding its credibility and objectivity. The 1946 broadcasting White Paper, drawn up by the Labor government under Clement Attlee, set out the relationship between government and the BBC, which still exists today. It read:
"The Government intend that the Corporation should remain independent in the preparation of programs for overseas audiences, although it should obtain from the government departments concerned such information about conditions in those countries and the policy of His Majesty's government towards them as will permit it to plan its programs in the national interest." 2 However, the wording doe not set out a clear dividing line about what the BBC can and not say. Research conducted with reference to primary sources and interviews with those who have worked in the BBC Persian service indicates strong pressure from the Government at crucial political conjunctures.
This paper attempts to look at whether the British Government as the provider of funds for the Persian Service has tried to use the broadcasts as a tool for political influence. It will in turn ask whether the Persian Service has --as part of the BBC's editorial whole -managed to keep its independence intact in reporting events in a balanced and objective way.
Since tackling the entire history is outside the boundaries of the present paper, selected critical periods are chosen whereby the relations between the Foreign Office and the Persian Service became more intense: the removal of Reza Shah Pahlavi in 1941; the UK-Iran oil negotiations during 1948-53; the period leading up to Islamic Revolution of 1979. Since the 30 year rule cannot as yet be applied to do the years 1978 and 1979, we can only reach close to the year of the Islamic Revolution in Iran.
The research is conducted through three primary sources: interviews with those working with the Persian Service, the archives of the Persian Service broadcasts, and documents of the Public Records Office. The paper has also examined several secondary sources such as books by those directly involved either at the British or Persian Governments or in the BBC. The researcher has herself worked for the BBC Persian Service for over 15 years and some of the accounts are based on primary observations. This paper will first set the scene as the BBC Persian Service is launched in 1941 and then examine the four named stages with reference to the central questions as outlined above.
Political Background
The BBC entered World War II unsure of its role. Britain was in a state of total war with every resource focused on winning the battle against the Axis powers. BBC archives recounts the story of the first days thus: "Managers at the fledgling corporation debated whether the BBC should report the conflict objectively -or contribute to the war effort by broadcasting morale boosting propaganda. By the autumn of 1940, Britain was suffering almost nightly bombardment from German planes. On 15 October a delayed action bomb hit Broadcasting House in London. It landed in the music library at 2010 GMT and exploded 52 minutes later, killing seven people. Listeners to the Nine o'clock news heard the announcer pause, and then continue reading."
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In the summer of 1943 the BBC's two "War Reporting Units" -were set up comprising of teams of seven containing a mixture of reporters, producers and engineers. The BBC created the title War Correspondent for Richard Dimbleby who covered World War II in Europe, Africa and the Middle East. In the years that followed war reporting became a specialist skill with new technical equipment and training which was different in nature to the daily news reporting. Reporting needed to take into consideration wartime security and intelligence requirements without being propaganda.
The BBC reinvented itself during the Second World War and public perception of the institution changed dramatically. It more than doubled in size and adopted a new culture and outlook. But the biggest expansion came early in 1940 and 1941, ahead of American involvement in the war, when the outlook for Britain was bleakest. The Government asked the BBC to increase its overseas effort three-fold. A special service for North America was introduced, offering entertainment as well as news of the British struggle. There were services in every major European language, from Scandinavia to the Balkans, plus services for the Soviet Union, Persia, India, Japan and many more. The War proved to be a tough test of the BBC's independence. At times the Government and the military wanted to use the BBC to counter crude propaganda from the Nazis, and there was talk in Westminster of taking over the BBC.
The Persian Service & Reza Shah
The BBC's Persian Service was one of these specially created language services when the British Government suspected the Iranian king, Reza Shah Pahlavi, of having sympathies for Nazi Germany. Reza Shah had in 1923 in fact come to power with the support of the British Government but declaring Iran neutral, he declined cooperation in the wartime. This concerned the British Government that he may in fact be taking a proHitler position and could potentially block the Allied efforts in the East.
Reading the correspondence between the British Legation in Teheran and the Foreign Office, it is clear that the war publicity was not working as effectively as might have been expected and many Iranians were also listening to Berlin Radio. "It should in the first place be emphasized that the following suggestions for the guidance of the BBC in the preparation of material for the projected news broadcasts in the Persian language are intended for the use of the regular British officials only and they should not be shown or communicated to any Persian speaking official."
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The suggestions in this memorandum are that:
"It is to be hoped that these new broadcasts will be devoted to the straight news of the world and that, while it is understood that the Ministry of Information will supply news telegrams containing items of more local interest, the broadcasts should as far as possible avoid going into Middle Eastern political questions…if some particular event requires clarifying or explanation, the Foreign Office will always be willing to advise on the commentary which the BBC would wish to add."
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At this stage the request is that Reza Shah should be treated in these broadcasts with due sensitivity and diplomacy because: "The Shah is not a popular figure but he is still in complete control and is likely to retain power. While gross flattery of his person or his rule should be avoided, he should be presented as an energetic modern-minded ruler, under whose rule Iran has made great economic and cultural progress. Iran's relations with His Majesty's Government are excellent. Emphasis might on suitable conditions be laid on the long-standing traditional friendship between the two countries…and care should be taken not to suggest that HM Government has any influence whatsoever on Iranian policy."
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In its very first broadcast on 29 December 1940, Hassan MovagharBalyuzi, the new young presenter recruited from Iran follows that line and introduces the BBC broadcasts as the dawning of a new era:
11 (FO371/24570) 12 (Ibid) 13 (Ibid) "The BBC Persian Service is aiding a new relationship between the two nations of Britain and Iran". 14 In the first few months, BBC Persian Service broadcasts consisted of short 15 minutes news bulletins of war only four nights a week. Abulghassem Taheri, also just recruited from Tehran, reports that the British Press welcomed the opening of the Persian Service as a step towards better relations with Iran.
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This line did not last very long. Over 1940-41, the British foreign Office documents reveal that Britain becomes increasingly impatient with Reza Shah over his lack of cooperation over the deportation of some 3000 Germans believed to be resident in Iran. Reza Shah kept on refusing on grounds that the Germans were mainly engineers employed in his modernization program and was refusing to deport them. However British Intelligence had documents revealing that famous German spies, such as Franz Mayer, were working in Iran. Indeed Franz Meyer had described in a letter discovered by British Intelligence that southern mountainous areas of Iran were a safe bastion for German military work:
"This is like a part of Germany or an unassailable allied state behind the enemy's lines in which you can do anything you wish, train, recruit, and build landing ground, munitions dump and Uboat bases."
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On 7 August 1941, just prior to the Anglo Soviet invasion of Iran Sir Reader Bullard writes in a "Most Secret" memo "Propaganda in Persia": "The question of propaganda against the Shah would be completely altered in the case of Russian/British ultimatum, which was to be followed by military action in a few days in the case of noncompliance. To forestall the Germans and make prospect of occupation more palatable we might simultaneously with the ultimatum, release articles and wireless talks about Iran (Persia), referring not only to the good points, but also to the great defects of the present regime, e.g. compulsory acquisition of land at dishonestly low prices, and the enormous cost of living. By then it should be too late for the Shah to throw himself to the arms of the Germans, while the army which is anti-Shah would be encouraged to turn against him rather than obey him." "Tribute could be paid to the Shah as a soldier in early days but be hinted that greediness and tyranny have made him a different man…forcible acquisition of land, forced labor, general poverty and corruption, acute shortage of water, Shah's own wealth and ownership of factories… his monopoly of all prices… his involvement with opium trade… his bad treatment of soldiers… weakness of the political structure…Constitution only in name, a powerless parliament, dictated elections… could be highlighted. Also it could be stressed that England has a democratic Government whereas the Shah, like Hitler, thinks the people are like sheep and are only fit to carry orders blindly." 18 Later, after the Anglo Soviet invasion of Iran, the British Foreign Office documents show that the British find it impossible to work with Reza Shah.
"His Majesty's Government have no wish to interfere unnecessarily in Persian internal affairs but it is clearly difficult for them to operate fully with an administration that had long ceased to represent the wishes of the people." 19 BBC Persian Service was then tasked with broadcasting items that revealed Reza Shah's autocratic style of leadership and encouraged instead a republican system of Government:
"His Majesty's Government now agreed that the BBC might begin to give various broadcasts in Persian which had been prepared beforehand, starting with talks on Constitutional Government an increasing in strength and color until all Reza Shah's mismanagement, greed and cruelty were displayed to the public gaze… encouraged by the lead given by the BBC, the deputies in the Majlis, who had been subservient to the Shah for many years, passed a resolution asking for reform… a deputation of them was to wait upon the Shah and ask him to abdicate… and within 3 weeks the Shah abdicated."
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[When reflecting on the relations between Iran and UK, the head of British legation to Iran, Sir Reader Bullard writes:
"On numerous occasions the Allies were unable to get even their most essential military requirements without the application of the strongest diplomatic pressure and once or twice the virtual threat of force. We were obliged to interfere regularly and radically in the local administration…There were times when we used to wonder whether in the end we might not have to take over the country and run it ourselves."
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Shahrokh Golestan, a well-known film director, says in an interview with the Persian service for the 65 th anniversary of Persian broadcasts:
"I remember vividly that every evening we used to get together with our neighbors to listen to the BBC Persian broadcasts. We all used to sit in a circle in the garden and the radio --which used to be kept on the second floor -would be turned towards the garden so we could all hear it. We listened every night, not just to the BBC, but also to Radio Berlin to make sure we didn't miss anything."
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The news bulletin was in fact written by the War Unit of the BBC and translated to Persian and broadcast by the new Iranian recruits. It was direct war reporting in the propaganda style of the day. The pressure by the Government on the BBC World Service broadcasts is reflected in BBC's own account of wartime reporting:
"From the start, there was tension with the government as to how much freedom should be allowed in wartime to the BBC radio news operations and it took time to establish an effective method of working between the BBC and the new Ministry of Information. BBC staff were seconded to the Ministry -and so-called "vigilants" 
The Persian Service and Oil Nationalization
After the war had ended, a period of reform and democratization ensued in Iran and with the departure of Reza Shah; the parliament became increasingly a major centre of decision-making. Political parties were formed each with their dedicated fractions inside the parliament, and often with their own preferences about foreign powers by now constituting the British, the Russians and the Americans. Although the British had their own parliamentary support, they were going through perhaps the worst period of their relations with Iran in as far as being out of favor with the majority of reformists.
Foreign Office documents indicate clearly the tension in diplomatic exchanges and the type of adverse publicity they had to face in the Iranian press. The details are outside the boundary of this research but the main reasons for strong anti-British sentiment included the role they had played in occupying the southern ports in 1940, the removing from power of Reza Shah, but most importantly their constant attempts at blocking the process of nationalization of Iranian oil -a subject very much on the agenda for the reformists and their leader, Dr. Mossadeq. "Sir Francis Shepherded [of the UK embassy in Teheran] has suggested, and we agree, that it would be useful to inspire the BBC's Persian Service at this present stage in the oil question…I enclose a draft memorandum bringing out the points we feel can usefully be made in this context. They are cast in such a way that nationalization is not, and cannot be a purely internal Persian problem. They are also designed to show the impracticality of nationalization and the financial and other losses which any such move may involve."
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The memorandum suggests seven lines of argument --including the financial losses, the harm to Iranian reputation internationally, the adverse effects on the industry --all of which are later picked up in a BBC talk published three days later on 4 March -just a day before the voting taking place in the parliament. Parts of the talk read as follows: "In the first place it must be remembered that the Anglo-Iranian oil company has invested vast sums of money…the arbitrary cancellation of the oil Agreement and the failure to honor an international agreement would seriously damage Persian credit and reputation in the world, more so if … it would be difficult to see how Persia thinks of paying a huge sum to which an international tribunal would certainly consider the company entitled… and there is the company's expenditure of tens of millions of pounds..." The British Government tried to forestall further Mossadeq action by a quick request to the international court of justice in Hague asking for an interim injunction calling upon the Persian Government not to prejudice the position of the AIOC. BBC reporting of Mossadeq's appeal to the UN against the AIOC angered many Iranians who considered it to be biased. In a memo entitled the "line for News Department and the BBC" on the possible failure of negotiation the British Embassy in Teheran suggests the following points. These points, written out in full detail, were given to the BBC following a briefing at the Foreign Office Norman Kemp in his account of this crisis period how tension between the UK and Iran was seeping down to journalists: "The British loss in Abadan has been described as "a tragedy of public relations." The Company had reckoned too much on, and waited too long for, Persian Governments to tell the Iranian people of the AIOC's offers. Persian journalists, with connivance of their Government, could be scurrilously biased in their invective…. Officially there was no censorship but the Government watched the press dispatches secretively and occasionally was disposed to delay transmission if a piece did not meet with approval. Mossadeq shrewdly divined that by splitting his news sources, he could gain greater publicity for his achievements to the confusion of the journalists." 43 He speaks in detail about the technical difficulties of getting news out of Abadan with problems with communication lines, telephones and exchanges and how the press received information.
"There was a pattern for news coverage in Abadan. First a conference with [Eric] Drake, [Oil Board] between nine and ten o'clock in the morning; then we wrote the stories in a small [AIOC] Company office adjoining the administrative block. A Persian staff clerk hired for us a taxi…which was sent to the frontier…local fishermen paddled the copy across the Shatt-elArab river at the border … then another taxi arranged buy AIOC carried it to … and then to Basra telegraph office. Once we had sent the reports we met the Oil Board… and for greater depths to news reporters interviewed privately the British Government and company officials and the Persian cabinet." 44 It is clear from this account that the bulk of information for Western media was provided by the AIOC, the British Government and embassy officials and the Persian press was mainly fed by Iranians officials 42 (Ibid p146) 43 (Ibid pages 146-7) 44 Ibid thereby causing the split in reporting and the resulting mutual distrust. The BBC Persian Service had both points of view under one roof and this must have been behind the strike by some of the staff. Norman Kemp speaks about the important role that the BBC played in giving information to Iranians. "The Persian authorities had suspended the Company's [AIOC] daily newspaper, and each afternoon and evening the oilmen huddled around radio sets to listen to BBC overseas broadcasts for up-to-date information. If Abadan or Teheran were not mentioned in the bulletins the staff was despondent, believing the omission was an augury of defeat."
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Nevertheless the pro-nationalization majority did not always trust the Persian Service's broadcasts. At the height of the crisis, when the US Government begins to mediate between Iran and UK, Hussein Makki, the trusted right hand man of Mussadeq takes the opportunity to attack the British conduct. On 7 August 1951 when as a member of the Oil Board he accompanied the US President's representative, Averell Harriman, to see the squalid conditions in the Persian oil workers living quarters in Abadan, Makki referred in his speech with suspicion to the BBC. "Should the Mussadeq Government suffer defeat, Soviet propaganda will convince the people that only with Russian aid can the Iranians succeed. It is in this that the greatest danger lays. The desire of the British capitalist is that nationalization should fail, they are shareholders in the AIOC and they are trying in every possible way and through underhand methods to bring down the Mussadeq Government. This is being done with the aid of the Persian-language broadcasts and the commentaries of the BBC, by inspired and biased articles in the British press…"
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In June 1951, while Mossadeq's Government was preparing to take control of Iran's oil industry and Britain was once again deploying military force in the Persian Gulf, the Foreign Office gave extra funding for half an hours' extra broadcast. The British Embassy in Teheran had asked for an extra 15 minutes. This was done in the form of an increase in the evening broadcasts becoming 45 minutes rather than 15 minutes and an additional 15 minutes afternoon broadcast. The latter was then 
The Era of Perceived Prosperity
After the turbulent years of 1951-53, there followed a period of relative calm. The young Shah of Iran, supported by the US and UK, was brought back to the throne. In the years that followed, large US military investment in Iran enabled the Shah of Iran to establish his power by early 60's. In 1963 he embarked on his "White Revolution." However, excessive reliance on foreign borrowing to feed the Seven Year Plan for economic development and escalating military expenditure had caused financial crisis forcing Iran to borrow heavily from the IMF, which in turn had asked for reforms in the way of trimming the budget, freezing wage rises and shelving some development projects. This became another cause for tension and opposition, this time led mainly by a powerful clergy but also involving National Front members.
In June 1963 there were massive demonstrations during the holy month of Ramadan led mainly by Ayatollah Khomeini, then 64 years of age. Thousands of shopkeepers, clergymen, teachers, Bazaar merchants and students came out to denounce the Shah. The demonstrations lasted for three days but left hundreds dead. The military kept its loyalty to the Shah and he weathered the storm. The Shah ordered the arrest of National Front members and deported Khomeini to Turkey from where he went to Iraq.
From the mid-60 to mid-70 the Shah was increasingly regarded as an unrivalled ambitious dictator, a devoted ally of the US and benefiting excellent relations with the international community. Iran was portrayed in the western press as enjoying full prosperity and economic growth. His ambitions took him so far as to begin to plan the well-known costly celebrations of 2500 anniversary of monarchy in Iran. The Iranian Ambassador to the UK, Parviz Radji, writes in the introduction to his book "In the Service of the Peacock Throne": "Indeed the Shah saw the 1973 boom in oil prices -for which he was the prime mover -as the moment to realize his grand vision of Iran, as a grand force to be reckoned with economically as well as militarily. Massive expenditure was taken beyond the human or infrastructural capacity of the country. These were the seeds of the gigantic economic dislocation that was to become increasingly apparent after 1976."
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Movements against the Shah were growing both inside Iran and in the West. These included from the most extreme left and underground movements to the religious clergy and the National Front. The International Confederation of Iranian Students had become organized across Europe, especially in France, Germany and in the UK. Shah's trips to Europe were often an opportunity for the Students Confederation to illustrate its growing power. As such the Shah often faced student demonstrations and personal attacks when he traveled abroad.
Lutfali Khonji, a veteran Persian Service broadcaster who joined the BBC in 1968, says all details of these demonstrations were given in BBC broadcasts and there were no restrictions on reporting anti-Shah slogans in broadcasts despite the amicable relations between the UK and the Shah. He says he never had any personal experience of being told what to say or which line to take although he was one of the main news editors, then known as "program assistant." But he adds that the program assistant was not writing the original reports, news or analysis.
"News items were --and still are --prepared in the Central Newsroom of the BBC and the analysis was written by British reporters. The program assistant only had the task of translating and broadcasting from English to Persian. Amongst the talkswriters were Evan Charlton and Squire Barraclough. If there was any pressure to be born, it may have been on Newsroom editors or the so-called "talks writers." In my experience, the BBC would never impose any line on any of its staff." 49 However, individual managers, reporters or analysts could be persuaded to toe a particular line, Mr. Khonji believes. Persuasion rather than force on individuals rather than on the system as a whole is the only possibility of influencing the news and analysis in the BBC according to Lutfali Khonji.
He says that it would be accurate to say that at times of crisis the program durations would always be increased by 15 minutes and with that the budget of the Service would go up. In response to a question about the relative lack of importance of the BBC during the 60's and early 70'swhen the Shah was most powerful -Khonji says: "That's because there was nothing important to report in Iran during the 60's. Whatever there was to report, was reported --such as the huge demonstrations against the Shah in Germany in late 60's or the case of someone standing up in the UN General Assembly in mid 70's calling the Shah "a murderer." There was little opposition and thus little newsworthy to report during the years after the US led coup of 1953 through to early 70's."
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The only unusual incident, according to Mr. Khonji was: "The Persian broadcasts would always play the Iranian national anthem when it was the Shah's birthday. This is very unusual for the BBC WS and begs the question why and whether this was to appease the Shah?" 51 Another veteran broadcaster, Majid Massoudi, says during this period the Shah used to listen to broadcasts and was putting pressure on the BBC. "Iranian intelligence ministry and other related organizations always listened to our program with diligence. Whenever we said something tiny that they considered anti Iranian they used to complain. We were always under pressure of such criticism." One of the common assertions amongst Iranians who were anti-Islamic Revolution is that the BBC would tend to be ahead of the news in Iran. It is asserted that the BBC would announce demonstrations before they were announced in Iran. I asked Mr. Khonji why the listeners had such impressions.
Khonji said "Those working in the BBC had their own set of contacts. I was the main link for the National Front and as such my friends would pass on the relevant news on developments. Improved communications techniques meant that the BBC could be heard far better in Europe and through the BBC broadcasts and the Iranian Diaspora were increasingly involved in the struggle for democracy in Iran. Another element that increased news coverage was that the BBC dispatched several reporters to Iran and thus could report from various corners of the country on developments. That meant the volume of incoming news was suddenly drastically increased. New methods of broadcasting such as interviews were allowed. Despite this there were only a few major interviews and the senior British managers did not feel too happy about these since they could not follow the contents. In the one year leading to the revolution, there was only one interview with Khomeini, three or four with Shapur Bakhtiar and two with Abdulkarim Sanjabi, who led the National Front activists."
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Khonji recalls a personal story when with great difficulty he managed to get an appointment for interviewing the leader of the revolution, Ayatollah Khomeini.
"At the time interviewing was done with great technical difficulty. We had to book studios and lines. I also had to speak to several contacts before convincing them of the justifications for the interview. Nevertheless, soon after arriving in the studio, Mark Dodd, the head of BBC WS arrived in the studio. I don't even know who had informed him that I was doing this interview. He barred me from interviewing and said we should not "artificially blowing the events out of proportion"
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Mr. Khonji uses this as an example to reject the common belief that the BBC was supporting the Islamic revolution in Iran. However, there is the possibility that Mark Dodd's assertion was made under pressure from the Iranian Embassy in London, which by then was growing increasingly furious with the BBC broadcasts as we will see below. He recalls that after about three weeks, Mark Dodd did allow the interview with Khomeini but the interviewer was a colleague who was against the Islamic revolution.
The contact that made the interview with Khomeini possible, Abulhassan Banisadr, says that the distrust of the BBC from the old days of the crisis still persisted. He says Khomeini was not at all convinced that he should give the interview to the BBC:
"I suggested to Khomeini to give an interview to BBC assuring him that they will broadcast exactly what he says. Khomeini rejected saying "BBC belongs to the British and it will not benefit us to give them an interview". I convinced him when I said all the other media you give interviews to, are also all foreign so what is the difference. Khomeini then accepted." 
